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Abstract: The diplomatic ties between Africa and Southeast Asia (SEA) have historically 
been sporadic and erratic. The only country in the SEA that the first decades after 
independence maintained a relatively narrower link to some African countries was Indonesia. 
Today, trade has gained momentum, being South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria, the largest 
trading partners of ASEAN in Africa, thanks to the growth rates of emerging countries in both 
regions.This increasing trade relation has been accompanied by some political diplomatic 
initiatives such as the AASROC (Asian African Sub Regional Organizations Conference), the 
NAASP (New Asian African Strategic Partnership) and the interregional approach between 
ASEAN and the African Union (may 2012). And, in the cases of Thailand, Indonesia and 
Malaysia, there has also been a slight development in bilateral relations. From a South-South 
perspective, our aim in this paper is to discuss the density and possibilities of this bilateral and 
multilateral relation and what consequences might bring to Africa. 
Keywords: Africa – Southeast Asia foreign policy – South South relations – diversification 
OS EMERGENTES NO CENÁRIO AFRICANO: UMA ABORDAGEM SUL-SUL DAS 
INICIATIVAS DIPLOMÁTICAS E COMERCIAIS DO SUDESTE ASIÁTICO NO 
CONTINENTE 
Resumo: As relações diplomáticas entre a África e Sudeste da Ásia (SEA) têm sido 
historicamente esporádicas e irregulares. O único país do SEA que as primeiras décadas após a 
independência manter uma ligação relativamente estreita de alguns países africanos foi 
Indonésia. Hoje, o comércio ganhou força, sendo a África do Sul, Egito e Nigéria, os maiores 
parceiros comerciais da ASEAN em África, devido às taxas de crescimento dos países 
emergentes em ambas regiões. Esta relação comercial crescente tem sido acompanhada por 
algumas iniciativas políticas diplomáticas, como o AASROC (Asian African Sub Regional 
Organizations Conference) NAASP (New Asian African Strategic Partnership) ea abordagem 
inter-regional entre a ASEAN e da União Africano (maio de 2012). E, nos casos de Tailândia, 
Indonésia e Malásia, também tem havido um ligeiro desenvolvimento das relações bilaterais. 
A partir de uma perspectiva Sul-Sul, o nosso objetivo neste artigo é discutir a densidade e as 
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possibilidades dessa relação bilateral e multilateral e que consequências pode trazer para a 
África. 
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Introduction 
The diplomatic ties between Africa and Southeast Asia (SEA) have historically been 
sporadic and erratic. The only country in the SEA that the first decades after independence 
maintained a relatively narrower link to some African countries was Indonesia. This approach 
was based on ideological and political issues, rather than economic ones.  
The Bandung Conference in 1955 – which was an Indonesian proposal
2
 – was a 
milestone in relations between the developing world, but it didn’t have a profound impact in 
Afro-Asian relations. While only five African countries attended the meeting, Southeast Asian 
countries had a very active participation, particularly Indonesia and Burma. According to Von 
der Mehden (1965: 345):  
The years since the Afro-Asian conference at Bandung have not seen the 
hoped-for development of Afro-Asian relations as such. Instead, conferences 
have tended to go in two directions, a concentration on their own problems 
among African members resulting in the formation of organizations 
composed of only African states and, secondly, the calling of conferences of 
a wider geographic significance and narrower ideological content.  
Since then, African countries had a more active participation in these forums while 
SEA countries diminished their participation. By the mid sixties only Indonesia was trying to 
influence in the Afro-Asian meetings, making up for its neighbors, who were not participating. 
Indonesia’s interest in these spaces was linked to its anti-imperialist ideology (during 
Sukarno’s government) and its anxiety to place itself as the leader of the developing nations. 
Later, it was also attempting to gain support for its anti Malaysian foreign policy. Following 
the sudden termination of Sukarno’s government, Suharto accessed to power and gave a new 
orientation to Indonesia’s foreign policy diminishing the interest for African-Asian 
cooperation (Fortuna Anwar, 2008). 
On the decades after the Bandung Conference, relations between Africa and Southeast 
Asia halted. It wasn’t until recent years that the trade and investment interests increased on 
both sides and generated a growing will for a rapprochement.  This renewed interest in 
interregional relations that emerged in the last decades led to the second Asian African summit 
                                                          
2
 The proposal to organize a Conference of the newly independent states of Asia and Africa was first put forward 
by the Indonesian Prime Minister, Ali Sastroamidjojo, during the first meeting of the Colombo Powers –Burma, 
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that was held in Jakarta in 2005. This event, meant to reinvigorate the Bandung Spirit, brought 
together more than a hundred Asian and African countries (Rediff, 2005).  
As stated before, trade has gained momentum. South Africa, Egypt and Nigeria are the 
largest trading partners of ASEAN in Africa, thanks to the growth rates of emerging countries 
in both regions (ASEAN statistics, 2012). This increasing trade relation has been accompanied 
by some political diplomatic initiatives such as the AASROC (Asian African Sub Regional 
Organizations Conference), the NAASP (New Asian African Strategic Partnership) and the 
interregional approach between ASEAN and the African Union (may 2012). And, in the cases 
of Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia, there has also been a slight development in bilateral 
relations.  
The paper wants to discuss the density and possibilities of this bilateral and multilateral 
relations and what consequences will bring to Africa, apart from its commercial and 
“extractive approach”. The paper will be structured as follows: in the first section we 
introduce some analytical concepts from a South-South perspective, in the second section we 
explore the  main characteristics of trade links and investment flows, in the third section we 
concentrate on the political and diplomatic initiatives including South-South cooperation 
initiatives, and finally we conclude with some highlights about the bilateral and multilateral 
relations and the consequences the growing presence of SEA emergent economies might entail 
for African countries. 
Conceptualizing diversification and South-South relations 
South-South cooperation, which had emerged during the seventies in contrast to North-
North and North-South relations, flourished again recently as a strategy of international 
positioning for countries in the developing world.   
In line with Lechini (2009), it must be highlighted that the failure of the neoliberal 
precepts of the Washington Consensus and its pernicious effects have favored the search of 
alternatives to achieve development different from those proposed by international financial 
organizations and central powers. Alternatives that contemplate heterogeneity among less 
developed countries (LDCs), that call for a wider participation of the State in the economy, 
that favor growth through cooperation within regional schemes, and that allow to reduce 
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dependency ties with central powers, in contrast to what the neoliberal formulas proposed in 
the last decades of the 20
th
 century.  
Southeast Asian economies, particularly Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, 
have deepened their search for partners in the developing world since the 1990s onwards. The 
1997 crisis made it clear for these economies that depending on few developed countries 
would only exacerbate their vulnerability to external changes highlighting the need for 
political and economic diversification.   
The world economic crisis that started in 2008 came to deepen this search for the 
diversification of links given the profound impact the crisis had on developed countries, 
economies on which depends the commercial insertion of the developing world. The 
international crisis highlighted, once again, the vulnerability that dependency on few partners 
generates in a scenario of instability. It also showed that South-South trade can be more 
resilient than other trade flows during crisis (Mikic, 2014), making the search for 
diversification of partners an even more desirable goal.   
Diversification along with enhancing South-South relations has become a central 
strategy for developing countries in order to diminish their dependency links and to gain 
greater margins of autonomy in an international level. Even though they are intrinsically 
related, diversification and South-South cooperation (SSC) should be differentiated. Mainly 
because diversification is a unilateral search for improving the international position through a 
reduction of the country’s vulnerability to external changes (Olivet, 2005; Faust, Franke, 
2004), particularly in the commercial dimension.  
On the other hand, South-South cooperation refers to a cooperative strategy between 
two or more countries, and is essentially political. According to Lechini (2012), South-South 
cooperation can be defined as: 
…a political cooperation that attempts to enhance bilateral relations and/or 
form coalitions in multilateral forums, to obtain a greater collective 
negotiation power, in defense of their own interests. It is based upon the 
assumption that it is possible to create a cooperative consciousness that 
allows developing countries to enhance their negotiation capacity with the 
North, through the acquisition of larger spaces of maneuver and, along with 
these, larger decision autonomy to face and resolve common problems. It is 
a political construction that, by its very nature, requires certain basic 
common assumptions (like-mindedness) (Lechini, 2012:18).   
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South-South cooperation, thus defined, may be divided in different typologies. 
Regarding the number of participants it may be bilateral or multilateral. Regarding the 
geographical location of the participants, it may be regional, interregional or transregional. 
And regarding the dimension it incorporates, it may be classified as technical, scientific-
technological, economic-commercial, and academic, among others.  
As it can be seen comparing both definitions, diversification does not require a 
consensus among different parts of the relation –in this case between different countries-, 
since it basically consists of an individual strategy, oriented at gaining a bigger margin of 
autonomy in some political or economic aspect. For example, diversifying oil sources may 
diminish dependence on few sources which in turn may decrease vulnerability to various 
external variables such as political instability in the supplying country, or an interruption in 
certain supplying routes. Then, as we will show in further sections, the increase of trade flows 
and investments between Southeast Asia and selected African partners reflects the unilateral 
need for diversification –mainly from SEA countries in the energetic sector or for markets for 
their goods- and as such its consequences are less beneficial to the African economies. 
In contrast, South-South cooperation represents a consensual strategy in which the 
main goal is to improve the international position of both parts. SSC may also be directed to 
improve development through the transfer of knowledge, funds, or other service from the 
donor country. Although this last typology does represent a better alternative for African 
countries to achieve greater development, SSC for development can also reflect power 
relations (Keet, 2006). This can be particularly the case when there are different levels of 
development between developing countries.  
As we introduce the different aspects of SEA relations with Africa we will resort to 
these concepts intended to analyze the bilateral links from a South-South approach. We aim to 
understand the impacts that the increasing presence of these emergent Asian countries might 
have on African economies. In the following section we deal with the economic and trade 
relations, highlighting the bilateral trade flows and composition, and the investment amounts, 
origin and destination country.  
Trade relations: different trends in the search for diversification 
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In this section we introduce the main economic figures of the relations between 
Southeast Asia and Africa. In order to do so, we have selected the main partners for Africa 
from Southeast Asia: Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Vietnam (SEA-5). On 
the African side, we have selected the top four destination and origin markets for SEA-5 
exports and imports: South Africa, Egypt, Nigeria, and Ivory Coast according to our main 
source, the UNComtrade Statistics Database (2014). 
As shown in figures 1 and 2 South Africa was SEA-5 main partner in the African 
continent, both as the origin of its imports as well as the destination of its exports. Thailand 
and -by a much lesser extent- Malaysia are the top export destination markets for South Africa 
in SEA. Over 52% of exports to the Southeast Asian region were sent to Thailand and 25% to 
Malaysia in 2012. South Africa's main exports to Thailand include stainless steel, aluminium, 
flat-rolled, iron and steel, paper pulp, chemicals, fresh fruit and ferro-alloys (International 
Trade Center, 2014). In the case of Malaysia, the main South African exports in 2012 were 
iron and steel derivates (35%) and coal (30% of the total). Other products in South African 
export basket to Malaysia were soya beans (UNComtrade, 2014). 
Although South Africa has been the main country of origin in Africa for SEA-5 
imports, there have been profound changes in the trade scenario in the last years. Imports from 
Nigeria, for example, accounted for an average of 21% between 2005-2009 of total imports of 
SEA-5 from the four main countries in Africa. But in 2012 its participation rose to 42%, only 
2% less than South Africa, traditionally the main country of origin of SEA-5 imports from 
Africa. This increase can be mainly explained by the growing percentage of exports to 
Indonesia. The flow of exports from Nigeria to Jakarta grew steadily since 2009. In 2012 
Indonesia became Nigeria’s main export destination in Southeast Asia, sending 79% of its 
products to this market. It must be highlighted that more than 90% of Nigeria’s exports to 
Indonesia consist of petroleum
3
.   
It does seem surprising at first, to see this pronounced increase in oil exports to a 
traditional oil-export-country as Indonesia. According to the International Trade Center 
(2014), “the country [Indonesia] has become a net importer of oil with rising domestic 
consumption and stagnant oil production”. Indonesia’s oil imports from the world grew from 
                                                          
3
 Out of a total of 2,700 million US$ of exports from Nigeria to Indonesia, 2,660 million US$ consisted of oil 
(UNComtrade, 2014).  
 
 
Florencia Rubiolo       16 
BJIR, Marília, v. 5, n. 1, p.8 -33, jan/abr. 2016 
 
19 thousand million US$ to 42 thousand million US$. This has increased the need for 
diversification of oil sources and as a consequence trade with Nigeria, a net oil producer, 
gained momentum. Nigeria is today the fifth import oil market for Indonesia, while in 2009 it 
was the tenth (International Trade Center, 2014).  
 
Data source: UNComtrade statistics Database 2014.  
Egypt and Ivory Coast constitute two small markets of origin for SEA-5 importers, in 
comparison with South Africa and Nigeria. Their participation in the total of exports from the 
main African partners to SEA did not surpass 10% from each country
4
. The main exported 
product to Indonesia in 2012 was natural calcium phosphate (mainly used in the production of 
fertilizers) –it represented 43.6% of the total-, the second product were dates –which 
accounted for 4%-. As In the case of Malaysia, the main exports from Egypt were oil and gas -
                                                          
4
 In 2012, Egypt accounted for 6.4% and Ivory Coast for 8.6% of exports from the African main exporters to 
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Figure 1: Total imports of SEA-5 from Africa, by origin country, 2005-2012 
in thousands of US$ 
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both accounted for 40% of total exports- and natural calcium phosphate -23.3%- 
(UNComtrade, 2014).  
For Ivory Coast the two main destination markets in SEA in 2012 were Malaysia and 
Vietnam. In the exports to Malaysia three products account for most of the export basket: 
rubber –that accounted for 42% of total exports -, cocoa –representing 32%- and cotton –
representing 16%. The products sent to Vietnam were mainly cashew nuts -61% of the total- 
and cotton -19% of the total-.  
To summarize the exports composition to the main destinations countries in SEA, we 
could observe different patterns of trade insertion. In the case of South Africa, trade data 
shows a more diversified export basket, with a high participation of manufactured products, as 
iron and steel. Besides this exceptional case, the three other African economies analyzed, 
show a highly concentrated export basket in raw materials and low-value-added products. The 
most outstanding case in this respect is Nigeria, with a growing dependence on the oil industry 
for its trade insertion in Southeast Asian markets.  
Respecting Southeast Asia’s exports to Africa, the main destination market -as stated 
before- has traditionally been South Africa (see figure 2). In 2012 the two main exporters from 
the SEA region to South Africa were Thailand and Indonesia. Thailand’s main exports to 
South Africa in 2012 consisted of vehicles and its parts -30%- , electronic equipment and 
house machineries -23%- , rice -9%- and canned fish -5%-. The top exports from Indonesia to 
South Africa were precious stones and precious metals, mainly gold -45% of the total-, palm 
oil -14%-, natural rubber -6.4%-, and vehicles and its parts -5%-.    
Regarding SEA exports to Africa, Egypt is the second destination country in the 
continent. In 2012 exports to Egypt represented 25% of SEA exports to the main markets in 
Africa. Given the meager amount of exports to SEA, this resulted in a trade deficit for Egypt 
of 2,872 million US$ (see table 1). Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand were the main exporters 
from SEA to Egypt in 2012.  
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Data source: UNComtrade statistics Database 2014.  
Table 1 shows the trade balance between SEA-5 and the main partners in Africa. Trade 
with South Africa, Egypt and Ivory Coast, results in a surplus balance for SEA-5. But trade 
with Nigeria shows a trade deficit for SEA, which equals the total exports from the region to 
the country.  This deficit is mostly a product of the trade imbalance in the relation with 
Indonesia.  
Table 1.1: Trade Balance, SEA-5 and top African partners, 2012 
In thousands of US$ 
 
SEA exports SEA imports Balance 
South Africa 6.320.647,70 3.598.860,00 2.721.787,70 
Ivory Coast 668.798,00 549.114,60 119.683,40 
Egypt 3.367.245,00 494.507,80 2.872.737,20 
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South Africa Ivory Coast Egypt Nigeria
Figure 2: Total exports from SEA-5 to Africa, by destination country, 2005-2012 
in thousands of US$ 
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Total 12.149.995,30 8.133.993,10 4.016.002,20 
From the trade analysis in this section, three main conclusions must be highlighted: the 
first one is that Africa is an increasing source of raw materials for Asian countries, and the 
relation that better reflects this rather recent phenomenon is Indonesia’s trade with Nigeria. 
This phenomenon is reproducing an extractive trade relation, within developing countries.  
The second one is that, the wealthiest African countries are becoming a main target for 
SEA countries that are seeking to diversify their export markets to new horizons. South Africa 
and Egypt are the two main receptors of these exports and are gaining relevance in SEA’s 
trade strategies. Thailand’s definition of South Africa as a strategic partner and gateway to 
Southern Africa is pointing out this way (CNBCAfrica.com, 2013). Indonesia’s policy to 
Nigeria –including the Presidential visit in 2013, the signing of and MoU for bilateral 
cooperation in 2010 (Nigeria Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013), and the creation of the Africa 
Trade Association (IATA)
5
, among other initiatives- are also oriented to expand African 
markets to Asian exports.   
Finally, there is a high concentration on trade relations only on a few African 
countries, as we have shown. These, rather than enhance development of the continent, or at 
least of a major part of it, will most certainly deepen the development differences within the 
continent.  
In the next part of the section we introduce the main investments from SEA in Africa, main 
destinations, Asian objectives and main strategies and possible consequences for the African 
continent.  
Investments: an opportunity for development? 
Developing countries in Asia are the largest sources of FDI from developing regions in 
the world. They account for three-quarters of the total of the developing world (UNCTAD, 
2013). This trend is being led by China’s FDI, but with an increasing participation of some 
SEA countries as Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. The major part of this FDI flows are 
                                                          
5
 The main goal of the association is to boost trade, with a focus on the growing opportunities available in 
African markets for Asian enterprises and the need for consumer goods while African producers are still small.  
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directed to countries within the same region, especially to those developing countries with 
lower labor costs such as Cambodia, Myanmar and Vietnam (UN ESCAP, 2013). Although 
most SEA FDI outflows remain in the region, there is an increasing interest from the 
governments and some companies to expand their assets to outside the region.  In this context, 
Africa is becoming an attractive destination for investments.    
A recent UNCTAD World Investment Report (2013) highlighted that the major Asian 
investor in Africa in 2012 was not China, it was Malaysia. According to the document:  
Malaysia, South Africa, China and India (in that order) are the largest 
developing-country sources of FDI in Africa. Malaysia, with an FDI stock of 
$19 billion in Africa in 2011 (the latest year for which data are available) has 
investments in all sectors across the continent, including significant FDI in 
agribusiness and finance. Its agribusiness investments are in both East and 
West Africa, while FDI in finance is concentrated in Mauritius (UNCTAD, 
2013:40). 
Along with Malaysia, Singapore is also one of the main sources of FDI to Africa from 
Southeast Asia. Singapore’s FDI in Africa is concentrated in Mauritius in the financial sector 
(UNDP, 2007: 19). On the other hand, Malaysia’s FDI is geographically and industrially 
dispersed. Although the main bulk is invested in Mauritius, there are also large investments in 
Sudan, Egypt, South Africa, among others (UNDP, 2007). The government of Malaysia has 
pursued flexible investment policies in order to encourage the local enterprises to invest in 
projects in diverse development countries. The main goal behind these policies was to ensure 
the development of world class Malaysian-owned companies, especially in the context of 
growing competition faced by Malaysian manufacturing exporters. 
The Malaysian Government’s support for outward FDI has been closely 
linked to South-South cooperation and promoting mutual benefits, especially 
after the former Prime Minister Mahathir led an investment mission to a 
number of developing countries in the early 1990s. Most of this activity is 
undertaken under the aegis of the Malaysian South-South Association 
(MASSA) established in 1991. This joint government and business support 
for South-South investment has helped to encourage FDI in Africa, as 
elsewhere, and offers Malaysian investors mutual support and confidence”. 
(UNDP, 2007: 33) 
In the African continent, Mauritius is the main destination of Malaysia FDI. The 
investments have grown along with the country’s tax facilities. Mauritius is world-wide-
known as a tax heaven and gateway to investments in Africa and India (The guardian, 2013). 
This is due to the many conditions the country has implemented to facilitate international 
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enterprises investments and the Double Tax Avoidance Agreements (DTAA) it has signed 
with twelve African countries
6
(UNCTAD 2013: 85). There are also cultural and historic 
reasons influencing Malaysia’s economic relation with Mauritius. Both countries have a long 
history of cultural bonds through migration, not only of Malaysians to Mauritius, but also of 
Chinese. There has traditionally been a large Chinese minority in Mauritius, as there is in 
Malaysia. This common feature has been an attractive condition –added to the financial ones- 
for East Asian economies, included Malaysia (Carter et al, 2009: 102).  
Malaysia has also been engaged in economic and financial activities for decades. As an 
example, during the seventies, when Mauritius established the first export processing zones 
(EPZ), significant investments came from Malaysia, along with Taiwan, Singapore and Hong 
Kong. In 1993, and in order to facilitate mutual investments, Malaysia and Mauritius signed a 
Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement.  
Nowadays, Mauritius has become one of the top three destinations of Malaysian FDI, 
with investments stock going from 3.3 billion US$ in 2008 to 6.9 billion US$ in 2012 
(UNCTAD, 2014).     
The second most relevant destination of Malaysian FDI to Africa was in the energy 
sector, mainly the oil extractive industry. In this regard, Petronas -the Malaysian state-owned 
oil and gas company-, has been a pioneer with investments in Sudan (since 1996), Egypt 





Malaysia’s increasing interest in investing in Africa and the support the Government 
gives to Malaysian enterprises to go out and explore new markets, can be explained by several 
reasons, that can also be applied in its investments in the developing world in general: the 
promotion of South-South cooperation, trade and investment; mutual benefit; energy security; 
realizing opportunities for growth and access to untapped markets; as well as the development 
of world-class enterprises (Dwinger, 2010). 
Another SEA country with an emergent presence in the investment sector in Africa is 
Indonesia, although the amount is still low compared to that of Malaysia and Singapore. The 
                                                          
6
 For a list Mauritius signed DTAA see: Mauritius Revenue Authority (2014). Retrieved from:  
http://www.mra.mu/index.php/taxation/double-taxation-agreements. Consulted: June 24, 2014.   
7
 Through its 80% owned subsidiary Engen Petroleum Limited. (Petronas, 2014)  
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main investments are concentrated in Nigeria. There are ten Indonesian companies which have 
invested in Nigeria and at least 32 other companies which have established business relations 
with their Nigerian counterparts. So far, the business engagements that have been established 
are related to the distribution and marketing of Indonesian products, such as paper, 
pharmaceuticals, electronic equipments, household equipments, food and beverages, etc. Some 
of the companies with investments in Nigeria are Indofood Sukses Makmur (Indomie instant 
noodles), Sayap Mas Utama (Wings Group – So Klin Detergent), Kalbe Farma Tbk. 
(pharmaceutical), De-Mastering Technology Service Ltd (A joint venture between Indonesian, 
Nigerian, Singaporean, and Malaysian entities), Magnet Integred (A joint venture between 
Indonesian, Singaporean, and Nigerian companies, in the compact disc industry) (Centre for 
Policy Analysis and Development on Asia-Pacific and African Regions, 2012). 
Indonesia’s expansion to Africa is also a part of a strategy to diversify markets for its 
exports, especially in an international crisis context. It is also in line with the set strategy to 
increase its non-oil and gas exports, particularly to non-traditional markets (Centre for Policy 
Analysis and Development on Asia-Pacific and African Regions, 2012). 
Notwithstanding the fact that SEA investments in Africa are in the rise, the amount of 
FDI is still in a low level. The main reasons behind this are: 1) the technological constraints in 
complex manufacturing activities and advanced services such as infrastructure development, 
communications, merchant banking or the media that some Asian firms still face;2) the 
barriers that Asian investors need to overcome in Africa (culture, information costs and 
transaction, market knowledge); 3) Asian FDI remains mainly intraregional and investors tend 
to look for opportunities geographically closer;  4) market seeking FDI is the most common 
and Africa does not generally have the types of markets most Asian firms are orientated to 
and; 5) the constrains imposed on FDI by regulatory frameworks both in host and home 
countries (UNDP, 2007:22).  
As closing remarks, it must be highlighted that, by the nature of the investments we 
have briefly exposed, the need to secure energy sources, and the urge to open new markets for 
goods and secure profit for enterprises, are the main interests of SEA investments in Africa. 
Diversification has thus become a central goal of foreign policies of SEA towards Africa. As 
we presented in the first section, diversification for itself cannot be understand directly as a 
South-South cooperation strategy, unless it is comprehended in a wider foreign policy in 
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which all the parts are benefiting. Among the Asian economies mentioned, Malaysia has the 
potential and the capital to engage in South-South policies, through FDI, outside its region. 
The approach towards Africa has been included in this logic. The rest of SEA countries, have 
entered the African markets through investments very recently and in meager amounts 
compared to those of the Malaysian enterprises –with the exception of Singapore–.  
There is certainly room to think that SEA approach to Africa can develop into a mutual 
benefit relation, with spill-overs into different parts of the economy and society. A major 
problem arises though: most of FDI has gone to less than a handful of countries in Africa. If 
this pattern persists, the main problem will be how to overcome the deepening of differences 
in development and economic performance within the African continent that Asian market-
seeking FDI will contribute to exacerbate.   
Going beyond trade? Incipient revitalized political-diplomatic relations 
Political-diplomatic relations between SEA and Africa have been sporadic since 1950. 
As we presented in the introduction, the Bandung conference was a first step towards and 
interregional approach, but that first effort was followed by decades of mutual indifference. 
The beginning of the 21
st
 century witnessed renewed interests from both regions towards a 
political rapproachment. The changes in the international scenario –both political and 
economically-, the needs for diversification, the search of certain actors for greater 
international leverage –such as South Africa and Indonesia-, were the main engines behind the 
interregional efforts to revive the “Bandung spirit”.  
The First interregional milestone in this effort to revitalize relations was the Asian-
African Sub-Regional Organizations Conference (AASROC). It was held in April 2003 in 
Bandung, Indonesia. The Conference was attended by 36 countries and 22 sub-regional 
organizations.  
The aim of the Conference was to consider issues of common interest and 
concern as well as to strengthen cooperation between the two continents. 
Through a number of discussions, the conference considered ways and 
means by which the people of the two continents could achieve full 
economic, cultural, social, and political cooperation and address global 
challenges facing both continents (ASEAN, 2014).   
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The Conference adopted a Co-Chairs’ Statement, which include the agreed on 
principles for co-operation between Africa and Asia, as the first concrete steps towards forging 
a New Asian-African Strategic Partnership (NAASP) (Embassy of Indonesia in Pretoria, 
2009). 
This unprecedented meeting was followed in 2004, by the second ASSROC, held in 
Durban, South Africa. The Conference discussed the need for establishing a new bridge 
between Asia and Africa. The Conference concluded that the establishment of a strategic 
partnership among countries of Africa and Asia is imperative in the context of the 
achievement of peace, prosperity and progress in the African and Asian regions (Embassy of 
Indonesia in Pretoria, 2009). 
In 2005, the Asian-African Summit and the Commemoration of the Golden Jubilee of 
the 1955 Asian-African Conference were held in Indonesia. A major event in that occasion 
was the adoption of the Declaration on the New Asian-African Strategic Partnership 
(NAASP). With the participation of 106 countries from Asia and Africa, NAASP has set a 
mechanism of Summits every four years (Thailand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013). The 
three main pillars of this multilateral cooperation initiative are: partnership, political solidarity, 
economic and socio-cultural cooperation. The declaration emphasizes the need to promote 
practical cooperation between the two continents in areas such as trade, industry, investment 
finance, tourism, information and communication technology, energy health, transportation, 
agriculture, water resources and fisheries (NAASP Senior’s Official Meeting, 2009).   
South Africa and Indonesia are the main driving forces behind the NAASP, and the 
current co-chairs. Although the initiative has the potential to become the main channel for 
cooperation between Asia and Africa, and a strong pillar for South-South cooperation, there 
are several challenges to overcome first.  The principal one is the fact that NAASP is yet to 
become a formal structure for multilateral cooperation. The second, and also a key one, is that 
since NAASP does not fall under the overall framework on multilateral cooperation within the 
African Union (AU), South Africa presented a proposal on the Integration of NAASP into the 
AU structures and processes in 2013 (African Union, 2013).  The African integration process 
has yet to decide over the issue. 
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The SEA countries participate in the initiatives described above, but along with many 
other Asian countries and organizations. There has been a more direct approach between SEA 
and Africa in May 2012, when ASEAN Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan and the head of the 
AU Commission (AUC) delegation Maxwell M. Mkwezalamba met in Jakarta in an effort to 
forge closer ties between the two organizations. Unlike NAASP, this attempt to enhance 
interregional cooperation has a more institutionalized framework since both institutions are 
internationally recognized and have a long history as integration processes. “Both 
organizations represent institutionalized socio-political unions that face similar challenges, 
share common interests, and operate under a related philosophy of non-intervention, respect 
for sovereignty, and peaceful negotiation. Thus, cooperative agreements between both regions 
seem likely to be both successful and effective” (Brown, 2012).  
These initiatives are the main multilateral cooperation instances that are being 
developed between Asia and Africa
9
. Both NAASP and ASEAN-AU relations emphasize the 
need to engage on practical cooperation on certain identified issues that represent common 
challenges to both regions. Unlike the 1950’s, this rapprochement between Asia and Africa is 
intended to concentrate efforts on common problems, rather than reinvidicate common Third 
World principles. Although there is a rhetoric based on the Bandung Spirit, the political 
changes and economic challenges have imposed the need for a renewed agenda.   
From the SEA region, the two main state actors involved in interregional cooperation 
with Africa are Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia is playing a central role in the multilateral 
initiatives we have briefly introduced. Malaysia, on the other hand, has played a more active 
role in the bilateral relations with selected African partners. Some initiatives from the 
Malaysian government towards African countries are the Langkawi International Dialogue 
(LID) and the Southern Africa International Dialogue (SAID).  Both initiatives were launched 
in 1995 and aim to develop and strengthen relationships between Malaysia and the African 
countries. LID is an initiative that aims to promote ideas and experiences on development and 
economic growth to developing countries in Africa (and the Caribbean). Malaysia acts as a 
host for the dialogue, and invites representatives from different sectors –both public and 
private- to discuss on issues related to socio-economic development. SAID is a follow-up and 
                                                          
9
 There are other initiatives that include African countries and one Asian country such as Forum on China-Africa 
Cooperation and Tokyo International Conference on Africa Development.  
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counterpart to LID, advising on the potential of the Southern African area for Malaysian 
entrepreneurs (Rafeeat, 2011).  
Also in relation to South-South cooperation practices, the Malaysian Permanent 
Mission to the United Nations (2013) has stated that:  
Malaysia cooperates with African countries through specific technical 
courses under the Malaysian Technical Cooperation Programme (MTCP) 
and through a triangular cooperation such as the Malaysian Technical 
Cooperation Programme (MTCP) - Japan International Cooperation Agency 
(JICA) - Africa (MTCP-JICA-Africa). Malaysia has also entered into 
specific cooperation programme with African countries through dialogue 
platforms such as the private sector involvement through Malaysian South-
South Association (MASSA) and Malaysian South-South Cooperation 
(MASSCORP). As of end of 2012, a total of 6797 participants, from 45 
African countries have benefitted from the MTCP. 
To summarize, SEA political relations with Africa are still in a low level of 
development and only a few Asian countries stand out as pioneers in this rapprochement 
effort. ASEAN as the regional organization in SEA has a strong potential to develop a closer 
interregional relationship with the African Union, but the remaining obstacles –mainly the 
distances, the lack of common cultural of historic elements, and the concentration on other 
partners, considered more strategic- are slowing up the process. On the other hand, there is 
growing interest in individual initiatives from Asian countries to approach Africa from 
different dimensions. Although trade and investments remain central issues on the bilateral 
relations, political and economic cooperation is gaining relevance, particularly in the case of 
Malaysian foreign policy towards Africa.  
Final remarks 
The investigation effort behind this paper was primarily meant to shed some light over 
an understudied phenomenon as it is the presence of SEA countries in Africa. As such, this 
article was intended to show an introductory analysis of the main economic and political 
features of the bilateral relations from a South-South perspective.  
In the first section we introduced some concepts with the intention to analyze the 
emergence of new actors in the African scenario in terms of development. Our central 
objective was to understand if the SEA approach to the African continent could turn out to be 
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beneficial to the host economies, even though the motor behind the policies towards Africa are 
self interested and market seeking.  
As a first conclusion we must highlight that SEA main partners in Africa are few and 
represent the biggest economies of the region.  Both South Africa and Nigeria account for the 
main part of the trade between Africa and Southeast Asia, and this trend seems to be 
deepening, mostly driven by the growing trade exchanges between Indonesia and Nigeria. If 
this concentration persists, it will probably generate economic benefits for the individual 
countries-which already are between the wealthiest economies in the continent- deepening the 
inequalities within African countries, instead of improving developmental capacities.  A 
challenge in this realm is how to attract investments from SEA to less developed countries in 
Africa, in order to start to correct developmental and wealth imbalances.  
The second and central feature of the economic relations is that African exports to SEA 
are highly concentrated on natural resources, and that feature is intensifying with the growing 
presence of Indonesia as Nigeria’s exports destination. Meanwhile, SEA exports to Africa 
consist mainly of manufacture goods, generating an inter-industrial trade pattern, with the 
exception of South Africa. A main challenge for African countries is to develop the needed 
structure in order to utilize the gains from this inter-industrial commerce to diversify their 
export-baskets and to direct FDI into economic activities oriented to local development.  
Finally, South-South cooperation between the two regions has been erratic and 
dependent on the individual will of certain countries but there are no formal channels of 
cooperation between the two regions besides Malaysian initiatives. There is certainly a wide 
arena to explore in technical and practical cooperation, as stated by the NAASP and ASEAN-
AU relations, and we might observe a growing of initiatives in coming years.  
To conclude, it is unfeasible to analyze the relations between this heterogeneous group 
of countries in only one set of concepts. Although they are all included as developing 
countries and, as such, they can be considered in the “South”, bilateral relations are diverse 
since the position these countries occupy on the “developing nations chart” are also dissimilar. 
There are different types of relations developing then: on the one side we have observe more 
symmetrical South-South bilateral relations between South Africa and its Asian counterparts –
particularly Thailand, Indonesia and Malaysia- in which both parts can benefit economically 
and politically, without reproducing dependency links. On the other side, less developed-
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natural resource exporting countries such as Nigeria and Sudan, are strengthening dependent 
trade and investment links, which have more features of North-South relations, than South-
South ones. It must be highlighted that technical cooperation in these countries could improve 
the developmental capabilities, but the number of projects in that field is still meager. So, as in 
the cases of many other less developed countries and regions, the emergence of SEA in Africa, 
is mostly concentrating on economic extractive activities and market seeking investments for 
Asian products, with a low participation on other political initiatives that could benefit the 
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